Canoeboot 20241102 released! 4 new mainboards added. 100% free software BIOS replacement, GNU FSDG compliant
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Canoeboot is a free/libre BIOS/UEFI replacement on x86 and ARM, providing boot firmware that initialises the hardware in your computer, to then load an operating system (e.g. GNU+Linux). It is specifically a coreboot distribution, like how Trisquel is a GNU+Linux distribution. It provides an automated build system to produce coreboot ROM images with a variety of payloads such as GNU GRUB or SeaBIOS, with regular well-tested releases to make coreboot as easy to use as possible for non-technical users. From a project management perspective, this works in exactly the same way as a Linux distro, providing a source-based package manager (called cbmk) which patches sources and compiles coreboot images. It makes use of coreboot for hardware initialisation, and then a payload such as SeaBIOS or GNU GRUB to boot your operating system; on ARM(chromebooks), we provide U-Boot (as a coreboot payload).
Summarised list of changes
The following boards have been added since the Canoeboot 20240612 release:
* Sony PlayStation (PCSX Redux Open BIOS)
* Dell Latitude E4300 (courtesy of Nicholas Chin)
* Dell OptiPlex 780 MT support
* Dell OptiPlex 780 USFF support
The OptiPlex models are X4X/ICH10 platform, while the E4300 is GM45/ICH9. Both run 100% blob-free, with the Intel ME firmware completely removed, by using modified Intel Flash Descriptors similar to that seen on ThinkPad X200/T400.
E4300 has the same installation procedure as the E6400.
More information available on the release page:
This are great news @libreleah. Thank you so much to keep posting in this forum, this is the only free software community that I really follow so I really appreciate that you do. If I'm not misunderstanding, you do not need an external programmer for the dells computers? Thank you.
In fact, all of the Dell computers (laptops and desktops) can be flashed internally, without disassembly and without needing external equipment; the latter may be desirable, regardless.
See:
https://canoeboot.org/docs/install/latitude.html
https://canoeboot.org/docs/install/dell780.html
The guides document the installation procedure, for Dell Latitudes and Dell OptiPlexes respectively.
You need to set a special jumper on the OptiPlexes, but this is easy to do.
I would also like to mention that the person who tested these images for me (on Dell OptiPlex 780 machines) happened to be running Trisquel GNU+Linux, which works very well on these machines.
How is the software to bypass bootguard going?
Also, can you load usb operating systems off of seabios yet? Regardless of the distro being used?
Dragora, Hyperbola, Trisquel, Devuan, etc... for examples?
I realize Devuan is an optionally free one too btw.
deguard is present in the current Libreboot release, and in lbmk.git, to disable the Boot Guard on Intel 7th gen; due to Intel FSP, this platform is not currently supported in Canoeboot, but it becomes theoretically possible in the future:
On 7th/6th gen you can run deguard to disable bootguard
Without or with bootguard, you get full execution on the ME (this is why you can disable bootguard, because it's handled by the ME). This is done by exploiting the SA-00086 bug on Intel MEv11, which can be used to enable arbitrary code execution on that ME version.
Microcode, though still a blob for now, can be modified by the user (red-unlock hack). Microcode updates required to fix CPU bugs on that platform,. but free microcode is theoretically possible.
All this would require extensive reverse engineering, but I can forsee the Intel 7th generation (skylake and kabylake) being supported in a future Canoeboot release; with sufficient work, the blobs could be reverse engineered and replaced.
Also, this is why Libreboot currently exists in the way that it does, to more easily facilitate such work, by using its automated build system design and easier infrastructure. Canoeboot provides releases based on Libreboot but with only those boards which do not require binary blobs in the main boot flash.
So you think you'll be able to get intel 6th and 7th gen computers running without binary blobs?
That would be interesting.
Tested on a Libreboot_X200 with Hyperbola GNU/Linux everything works.
Thanks!
Hi LibreLeah,
We do not use vboot as it was declared non-free. I was wondering if cbmk makes use of vboot, as I see it has the submodule.
How did you get around the non-free code?
> We do not use vboot as it was declared non-free
Let's please have some nuance on that statement, is not that vboot-utils (vboot) is non-free, it uses some test data which is are blobs, others have no license and some others are plain non-free, that in itself doesn't render the whole package non-free, just the test data. AFAIK, GNU Boot uses vboot, just removing the data folder in their source.
So far, we have not had the time to untangle that so it has been removed while we find the time to remove that data, or have some answer upstream replacing that data with some better licensed one.
Please follow the thread at:
https://gitlab.trisquel.org/trisquel/package-helpers/-/issues/178
Your ignorance on this matter is astounding. If you'd actually read that announcement, you'd not say such a thing; your statement suggests that you skimmed the article for maybe 5 seconds. I'm actually annoyed that you even asked.
Skim this: Vboot is completely free software, but contains some non-free test data. I actually discovered this fact last year and deleted a number of them in the October 2023 releases of Canoeboot, **which was 1 YEAR AGO**.
A few more more were also discovered and deleted during 2024 when updating the coreboot revisions during that year. If you do spot any more, please let me know. I know the GNU people also have been raising a stink about this and contacting various projects that use vboot utilities.
Canoeboot is unaffected by this issue, rest assured. I delete the non-free data from vboot, and have done so since October 2023; I even contacted GNU about it and was ignored, until they discovered it themselves more recently :)
I also discovered a few more blobs recently, which both Canoe and GNU forgot to delete; I've informed GNU of the latter. See:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/gnuboot-patches/2024-10/msg00029.html
They have now been addressing this, in recent patches as of November 2024. The vboot test data and the additional blobs linked above have all been *removed* in Canoeboot 20241102.
Now,
If you want to ask such a question in the future, here's how to answer it yourself:
Check the "nuke.list" files in cbmk, as described here:
https://canoeboot.org/docs/maintain/
Specifically: https://canoeboot.org/docs/maintain/#configprojectnuke.list
Vboot is a submodule of coreboot, so you wouldn't have a nuke.list for that, you would instead have it for the coreboot directory that it goes into. So for example in cbmk if you look at the file:
config/coreboot/default/nuke.list
As of the November 2024 release, you can see this entry:
3rdparty/vboot/tests/futility/data
Now, assuming you actually read this post, which I assume you didn't because you asked such a question in the first place which would suggest that you didn't read the original posts elsewhere about this topic, you will now know how to answer your own question next time, instead of annoying me with a question about an issue which I already reported myself 1 year ago.
The reason I'm irritated is because they actually had the gall to add in their bug tracker a TODO to contact Canoeboot about this issue, even though I reported it to *them* a year ago. So you ask such a question of me, because they rose a stink about it, but if I raise a stink about it, you wouldn't care, right?
I chose to respond to you, because unfortunately, this forum is full of people like yourself; many of them may even have only read what *you* wrote (after you didn't read what someone else wrote), and repeat what you said. It's like a game of chinese whispers and the resulting facts at the end are complete gibberish.
Think for yourself, and apply yourself, and don't waste my time again. Thank you. Now that I've gotten this out of my Canoe system, I can move on.
And if this insults you, that's good; use that anger and remember again my wisdom: think for yourself, apply yourself. Know your stuff. You know, actually read things and make your own mind up. Do your own research etc. Don't just repeat what you heard mindlessly like some annoying person on youtube comments sections.
Also, all of vboot can probably just be deleted to be honest. I really only need it because of a few headers in it that cbfstool uses; vboot itself is not used at all, either in Canoeboot or Libreboot. So I could just rip out the bits I need for cbfstool and patch the latter.
Vboot is Google's own security thing, that they used for verified/measured boot attestation on chromebooks, though you can also use it on a few x86-based machines.
I personally consider it to be security threatre (flash write protection and a bit of epoxy plus hardening at OS level is all you really need), but hey, nobody really cares what I think do they?
Hi buddies. Let us be off the ethical issues. I want to talk about two technical problems.
The one is a very old bug and the other is a new logic hole after the release 20240510.
For the old one, please first see the file https://codeberg.org/canoeboot/cbmk/src/branch/master/config/grub/default/config/payload.
As you see, the case of the unencrypted raw device is in line 94 and line 124. But the case of the encrypted raw devices is missing. We should do some fix from line 159 to line 170. Otherwise, we will fail to decrypt the encrypted raw devices on boot.
For the new logic hole after the release 20240510, in fact, it is not a bug, just we can improve it.
Since SeaBIOS is as the primary payload after 20240510, if users want to keep the top security. They have to give up the SeaBIOS function. (As described in https://canoeboot.org/docs/gnulinux/grub_hardening.html ) Otherwise, even the strongest GRUB hardening is enabled, the attackers with the ability of physical access the computers can boot any OS from the SeaBIOS menu.
What a dilemma!
Before the release 20240612, we can keep the top security of GRUB and the SeaBIOS function.
How? Because we have seabios.elf in those roms. After input the correct GRUB password, we can do chainloader. This means attackers without the GRUB password cannot boot.
Therefore can we recover?
I've made a note of this and will look into it at my next audit, regarding raw devices.
As for your second issue, and as mentioned on the very page which you link, it's possible to mitigate the SeaBIOS issue by disabling option ROM execution. You could also (if GRUB is already confirmed to work on your board) remove the SeaBIOS payload entirely, renaming the GRUB payload accordingly. For example, check:
./cbfstool canoeboot.rom print
If SeaBIOS is fallback/payload and grub is img/grub2, do this:
./cbfstool canoeboot.rom remove -n fallback/payload
./cbfstool canoeboot.rom extract -n img/grub2 -f grub.elf -m x86
./cbfstool canoeboot.rom add-payload -n fallback/payload -f grub.elf -c lzma
Then do this:
./cbfstool canoeboot.rom print
Confirm that GRUB is now fallback/payload; the size reported should be the same as what it was when it was img/grub2.
Now you can simply flash the result.
Also, instead of removing the SeaBIOS payload, you could extract it as above, to, say, seabios.elf on disk, and do:
./cbfstool canoeboot.rom add-payload -n seabios.elf -f seabios.elf -c lzma
The grub.cfg in Canoeboot will still show an option to boot SeaBIOS, if it's seabios.elf in flash.
I use the latter setup myself, on my own machine, though I use Libreboot on my personal machine, and not Canoeboot, but both projects use the same fundamental design.
EDIT:
Also mentioned on the link if you keep SeaBIOS, is how to disable the SeaBIOS menu and ensure that it only loads GRUB. This way, you never have the ability to load anything except the GRUB payload, from SeaBIOS. The reason it's there like that is because on some machines such as desktops, you would rely on executing the VGA ROM on a graphics card, though for Intel graphics on laptops it's not needed so perhaps you could try my advice above in making GRUB the first payload. On setups with graphics cards (desktop computers), SeaBIOS handles it and GRUB piggybacks off of the work that SeaBIOS did, otherwise there would need to be a separate coreboot config just for graphics cards, due to the way coreboot works; coreboot can handle one or the other, not both, but with coreboot doing native Intel graphics initialisation, and then loading SeaBIOS, SeaBIOS can handle graphics cards and therefore both scenarios are supported with the same coreboot configuration.
The reason SeaGRUB is the default even on laptops (where you would only have Intel graphics and therefore not need SeaBIOS for that) is because GRUB had some issues which I fixed in an earlier release, that before it was fixed caused some bricked machines. SeaBIOS tends to be more stable and break a lot less, so SeaGRUB is a sensible compromise that reduces the chance of bricks if I mess something up in a future testing release. So if I miss something on one of the machines and GRUB is unstable, SeaBIOS at least works.
Canoeboot/Libreboot are currently stable, where GRUB is concerned, but in the May 2024 releases I merged xHCI patches that actually caused memory corruption issues on some older boards if the OHCI driver was activated in GRUB. I mitigated it by not including xHCI support on such machines affected, which didn't need xHCI support in GRUB anyway, and the machines affected were actually Sandybridge machines which Canoeboot doesn't support anyway, so the machines in Canoeboot were probably fine - however, just to be safe, what I did was delete every ROM image for the May 2024 releases of both Libreboot and Canoeboot, and start a massive audit (audit 6 in libreboot and audit 2 in Canoeboot), which resulted then in the Libreboot 20240612 and Canoeboot 20240612 releases, which were both stable releases.
Thanks for your patient answers.
For this sentence "Also, instead of removing the SeaBIOS payload, you could extract it as above, to, say, seabios.elf on disk", do you mean as follows
./cbfstool canoeboot.rom extract -n fallback/payload -f seabios.elf -m x86
By the way, if I follow your personal setup (default payload swap), do we need to remove the file bootorder in the roms?
Maybe you should rewrite https://canoeboot.org/docs/gnulinux/grub_hardening.html (based on our dialogs) to tell users how to achieve the top security, meanwhile keep the SeaBIOS function.
Yes, and then insert it as seabios.elf
In other words, inside the ROM images, you will have renamed SeaBIOS (fallback/payload) to seabios.elf and GRUB (img/grub2) to fallback/payload
As I've already mentioned, this is already written on the page. Quote:
https://canoeboot.org/docs/gnulinux/grub_hardening.html#disable-the-seabios-menu
You insert the bootorder file, so that SeaBIOS boots GRUB first, and then disable the SeaBIOS menu; by doing both things, SeaBIOS only loads GRUB and nothing else.
In that configuration, it will still execute option ROMs. On a laptop this shouldn't be an issue, since you would also write protect the flash and you're not inserting any there, but on a desktop you might consider disabling option ROM execution (also covered on that guide).
How to handle option ROMs, mentioned here:
https://canoeboot.org/docs/gnulinux/grub_hardening.html#seabios-option-roms
Disabling option ROMs is ill advised if you need to use a graphics card.
Hi, Leah.
I also met the problem which is described in https://codeberg.org/libreboot/lbmk/issues/189 in Canoeboot txtmode roms from release 20240504 to the latest release.
In that page, you said you have hide those outputs. I guess you have only tested the framebuffer roms. This is why I can still see them in txtmode roms.
By the way, note the line "\nAttempting to parse iso/sys/extlinux config from 'ahci' devices" in https://codeberg.org/libreboot/lbmk/issues/189.
This is a newline output typo in the file https://codeberg.org/canoeboot/cbmk/src/branch/master/config/grub/default/config/payload.
Hello everyone.
Has the GRUB password input bug been solved? Libreboot is as quiet as a coffin in IRC and no one is answering))
The problem is this:
For example, a user has encrypted GRUB.
Then the user turns on his computer and the first thing he sees is a request to enter "username".
For example, my username is trisquel, I made a mistake and wrote trisqueL and I want to delete the letter "L" I press "Backspace" on the keyboard and my cursor moves forward, not back and deletes the letter "L". The "Delete" button does not react at all!
Whoever has encrypted Grub can check.